F55 - International Institutional ArrangementsReturn

The paper enters the debate connected with the broad issue of alleged democratic deficit of the European integration. The authors follow one branch of this debate, i.e. the democratization through parliamentarization of the European Union. They develop David Kral's analysis of the functioning of EU affairs oversight in both chambers of the Czech Parliament. Regarding this issue, the authors emphasize the role of EU Affairs Committees within the oversight mechanism. They analyze the composition of such committees in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Czech Parliament, considering the concentration, continuity and specialization of the membership. In all these criteria, the EU Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies expresses lower concentration and continuity (both in time and in comparison with another standing committee and EU Affairs Committee of the Senate) and more fragmented specialization. These differences may contribute to different oversight performance of both chambers and the results of this exploratory analysis open further research possibilities on the strategies of parliamentary party groups regarding the nomination to these committees.

The Lisbon Treaty has carried out an exact and systematic classification of decision procedures in the legislative area. It distinguishes two kinds of mutual interaction of the most important EU organs in adopting legislative acts of the Union: the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) and the special legislative procedure (SLP). While the OLP has only one firmly set form, the SLP has in total four concrete forms, depending on whether the Council decides by a qualified majority or unanimously, and whether the European Parliament (EP), is engaged in the decision-making merely on the basis of unbinding consultation or there is unconditionally required its consent for the adoption of the legislative proposal. There frequently occurs an opinion that the SLP is being applied in areas where member states have been unable to agree on the application of majority decision-making, i.e. on the abolition of the possibility of veto from the part of any of them. The article brings forth a certain discussion about a situation when the application of the SLP means the exclusion of all supranational elements from decision-making and when on the contrary, it can signify their certain strengthening in comparison with the OLP.